Use of force in the United Nations

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Page 1
The use of force for collective security
and peacekeeping at the end of the
twentieth century
 
 
 
NURULLAH YAMALI
JUDGE
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
TURKEY

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2
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...3
I-THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS……4
II-THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE IN UN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS……………………………………………………....6
III-PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY………………………………………………………………………………...8
A- SOMALIA…………………………………………………………...8
B- BOSNIA-HEREGOVINA…………………………………………..9
C- RWANDA………………………………………………………… 10
IV-CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………12
BIPLIOGRAPHY

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3
REFLECTIVE LOG
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION
The League of Nations was founded after the end of World War I, to maintain the
world peace and security. However, it could not take an active role regarding the problems
that are appeared in the 1930’s. As a result the World War II broke out and the League ceased
its activities during the World War II. In 1946 United Nations (UN) took the place of League
of Nations, which had the same purposes and same methods. The UN Charter is more
detailed and specific than League Covenant, since the founders of the UN aimed to establish
more effective mechanism to support the international peace and security.
1
In this context, in
order to keep the peace and security, the Charter first of all offers pacific settlement of
disputes. According to the Article 33 of the Charter provides that the parties to any dispute
shall seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice, and if it is necessary the Security Council shall call upon the parties to settle their
dispute by such means. If a dispute cannot be resolved by these peaceful means, and the
continuance of it constitutes a threat to the peace, the Security Council will make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken. These measures, which include
use of force as well, are clarified in Chapter VII of the Charter.
However, during the cold war the UN could not take steps effectively, because in the
Charter the authority of the operation for collective security was awarded to the five
permanent members of the Security Council.
2
These permanent members were China,
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, which could veto any
decision on enforcement actions. Unfortunately, the permanent members could not reach a
                                                            
1
Smith, E.M., “Collective Security, Peacekeeping, and Ad Hoc Multilateralism” in Ku, C. and Jacobson, H.K,
(ed) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2003) p.83
2
Ibid

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4
consensus and as a result the UN could not carry out military operations.
3
In this lack of
consensus, the UN has found an alternative peacekeeping measure which requires the consent
of the state concerned and voluntary nations to participate.
4
However, there is not a definition
of peacekeeping and an authority to establish such operations in the UN Charter.
5
Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping operations developed some legal principles such as consent,
neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in self-defence.
6
Although it underwent some
changes, due to the needs to maintenance peace in the world, peacekeeping operations kept
these legal principles.
This paper will focus on one of these principles; the use of force in peacekeeping
operations. In order to make an analysis, at first this work explores the constitutional basis of
UN peacekeeping operations, thereafter it deals with the historical development of the use of
force in UN peacekeeping operations. Finally, it will assess the peacekeeping operations
which took place at the end of the twentieth century, such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.
I
-THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Peacekeeping operations were built up by the UN after the failure of the collective
security system, which requires cooperation of the major states, envisaged in the Charter.
7
As
it is mentioned above The UN Charter does not include a definition of peacekeeping
operations. The lack of definition cause trouble about the limits of peacekeeping, but at the
same time provides a wide capacity for peacekeeping to deal with different kinds of threats to
international peace and security.
8
When the first peacekeeping operation established, the
former UN Secretary- General Dag Hammarskjold described peacekeeping operations as
“Chapter Six and a Half”, falling conceptually between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the
Charter.
9
Indeed, the peacekeeping operations cannot be defined as a peaceful resolution or
an enforcement power.
Cox claims that “the constitutional basis of the UN peacekeeping operations is the
“broad mandate” of Article 1 of the Charter.”
10
Literally, in the Charter the first purpose of
the UN is described as “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.”
According to this provision the UN has the authority to take the most effective measure in the
conditions of day-to-day in order to maintain international peace and security. In the Certain
                                                            
3
Ibid
4
Sarooshi, D., “The United Nations and The Development of Collective Security” (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1999)
5
Amy E. Eckert, Comment, “United Nations Peacekeeping in Collapsed States”, 5 J. Int'l L. & Prac. 273, 282-
84 (1996)
6
Katherine E. Cox, “Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Use of
Force”,(1999) 27 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 239
7
Tsagourias, N. “Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality And The Use Of Force In Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional
Dimension” (2006), 11 J. Conflict & Security L. 465
8
Ibid
9
n 5, above
10
n 6, above

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Expenses request for Advisory Opinion the International Court of Justice adopted the same
view related to the issue of their constitutionality. In this case, the former Soviet Union and
France refused to pay their share of the peacekeeping operations UNEF I and ONUC’s bill.
They claimed that such actions were not “expenses of the Organization”
11
The Court stated
that “When the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate
for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations; the presumption is that
such an action is not ultra vires the Organization”
12
Besides that, the peacekeeping operations rely on three fundamental principles that
contribute to their constitutional basis. The first principle is the solution of the issue about the
legal basis for the emplacement and presence of a peacekeeping force within a state. The
emplacement and the continuous presence of a peacekeeping operation requires the state’s
consent, otherwise it will be a violation of the Article 2 (7) of the Charter, which prevents the
UN to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the states.
13
A UN peacekeeping force should be “strictly impartial”.
14
As Sutterlin states, “it
must be prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned.”
15
It is a fact that,
the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation depends on the expectations and assessments of
the parties.
16
Therefore, to ensure impartiality will be very difficult, especially in the conflicts
that include many groups.
17
The last fundamental principle of the peacekeeping operations is to use of force only
in self-defense. The force of use in peacekeeping operations has two aspects, the first is
minimum use of force and the second is the use force for self-defense only.
18
A clear
definition of “the use of force except in self defense” have been made in the case of UNEF I,
“men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are
entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use of force to
make them withdraw from positions which they occupy under orders from the Commander,
acting under the authority of the Assembly and within the scope of its resolutions.”
19
In this
definition the key point is not to take the initiative in the use of armed force. Sloan describes
this limitation as the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
20
Except the principle of the use of force only in self defense, the other principles
remained constant from the first examples of the peacekeeping operations to actual ones.
However, due to the unforeseen situations especially the scope of the use of force in
                                                            
11
Ibid
12
Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
13
n 7, above
14
Viseman, H. “Peacekeeping in the International Context” in Rikhye, I.J., and Skjelsbaek, K. (ed.) “The United
Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limits and Prospects”, ( International Peace Academy, Newyork, 1990)
p.32
15
Sutterlin, J.S., “ The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: Repelling Aggression and
Enforcing Peace”, ( Praeger Publisher, 1995)
16
n 14, above
17
Ibid
18
Murphy, R., “United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of Force” (2003) 8
J.Conflict&Security L. 71
19
It is quoted in Sloan, J., “ The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?”
(2007) Hastings Int’l&Comp.L.Rev.385
20
Ibid

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peacekeeping underwent some changes. The next chapter will deal with the historical
development of the use of force and the reasons of these developments.
II- THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
 
The general rule for the use of force, only in self-defense, in peacekeeping operations
was the limit for the first armed UN peacekeeping operation, UNEF I. It was narrow and but
adequate for the UNEF I operation because the UN troops were charged to maintain a cease-
fire on a front line between two orderly armed forces.
21
In addition, there was another
advantage of the case that only a small civilian population was living in the area. Therefore,
there was no need for an extra force than UNEF I was authorized to use.
22
However, it was not the same for ONUC, the peacekeeping operation of UN in the
Congo. In his first report to the Security Council on the Congo operation the Secretary-
General Hammarskjold stated the principles that would govern the activities of ONUC.
According to the report:
“-ONUC might be considered as serving an arm of the Government for the purpose of
the maintenance of law and order and protection of life…
-The United Nations military units are not authorised to use force except in self-
defense. They are never to take the initiative in the use of force…”
23
But due to the disorder and violence in Congo, the peacekeeping operation started to
face difficulties. It became evident that “ONUC could not achieve its objective of halting the
civil war whilst it was limited to the use of force within the confines of ‘personal self-
defense.”
24
Following the increase in violation, the Security Council authorized ONUC to
take “all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including
arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes,
and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.”
25
Again, in September 1961 The Security
Council authorized ONUC to “take vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force,
if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention . . . or deportation of all foreign
military and paramilitary personnel . . . and mercenaries.”
26
Although ONUC was a
peacekeeping operation, it involved some enforcement elements and as a result the UN’s
experiences in Congo improved the definition of the self-defense.
27
                                                            
21
n 6, above
22
Ibid
23
n 15, above
24
n 6, above
25
It is quoted in Sloan, J.,n 19, above
26
Ibid
27
n 6, above

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After ONUC, it is accepted that a broader definition of self-defence would lead the
UN to be more effective. That is why; Cox asserts that “due to its expansive use of force,
ONUC played a notable role in the development of the use of force within the realm of
peacekeeping”
28
After the violent conflict that had broken out between the Greek and the Turkish
Cypriot communities in Cyprus the Security Council decided that a peacekeeping force
(UNFICYP) should be sent to island.
29
The Secretary-General defined the self-defense in his
report to the Security Council;
“The expression self-defense includes the defense of the United Nations posts,
premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as support of other personnel of UNFICYP
under armed attack… Examples in which troops may be authorized to use force include
attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under
orders from their commanders, attempts by force to disarm them, and attempts by force to
prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.”
30
The most significant expansion here is the authority to use force against attempts by
force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities. The expansion in the definition
of the self-defense continued and about the UNEF II peacekeeping operation the Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim stated that “… shall not use force except self-defense. Self-defense
would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its
duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”
31
Similarly the “defense of mandate”
repeated with UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon” and covered the subsequent UN’s
peace keeping operations.
32
As mentioned above, the peacekeeping operations were built by UN in order to
strengthen its efficiency particularly during the cold war. In my opinion, the major result of
the peacekeeping operation is that “efficiency is a positive function of use of force”. That is
why; the UN had to expand the definition of self-defense in peacekeeping operations. The
expansion of the definition did not conclude after UNIFIL, in direct contradiction it has
gained new aspects.
III-PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
                                                            
28
Cox, n6, above
29
n15, above
30
Ibid
31
It is quoted in Sloan, J.,n 19, above
32
Cox, n6, above

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Frederking states that, peacekeeping operations have evolved through there different
eras: “first generation” peacekeeping during the cold war, “second generation” peacekeeping
between the late 1980’s and the early 1990s, and “third generation” peacekeeping after the
late 1990s.
33
In this chapter, the evolution of the self-defense term, in the peacekeeping
operations which took place at the end of the twentieth century, the second generation
operations will be explored.
A- SOMALIA
In March 1992 a cease-fire agreement was made between the principal warring factions in
Mogadishu that included the envisage of a fifty unarmed UN military observers to monitor
the cease-fire in Mogadishu and a UN security force (UNOSOM I) to provide Un relief
convoys with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack which were authorized to fire
only “in self-defense” as a last resort.
34
The factions did not comply with the cease-fire’s
provisions and the security force became inadequate to achieve its purpose in that difficult
conditions. Thereafter the UN Security Council decided to deploy four additional UN
security units, but it was very difficult to deploy them outside the Mogadishu because first of
all, there was not consent of the factions to do so and it was dangerous the dispatch of lightly
armed soldiers in that conditions.
35
In his report to Security Council the Secretary-General stated that the current
conditions in Somalia prevent the UN operations to achieve the objectives approved by the
Security Council, whereupon, the Security Council determined that the human tragedy caused
by the conflict in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security and
authorized the member states “to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”
36
For the first time the
Council described an international humanitarian crisis as a threat to international peace and
security justifying the use of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.
37
The
mission of this American-led operation (UNITAF) was limited to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and it was
succeeded with a few casualties.
38
In his proposals to the Security Council for the UN force to replace UNITAF, the
Secretary-General stated that the threat to international peace and security still persisted thus
UNUSOM II would have to be authorized with the enforcement powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter.
39
In the Security Council Resolution 886 it is stated that “the highest priority of
UNOSOM II continues to be to support the efforts of the Somali people in promoting the
                                                            
33
Frederking, B., “The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold
War”,(Routledge, Oxon 2007)p.41
34
n15, above
35
Ibid
36
Ibid
37
n33, above
38
n15,above
39
Sutterlin, n15 above

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process of national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions”
40
Sutterlin
rightly interprets this expression as the combination of “the military task of peace
enforcement with the political task of peace-building”
41
The UN operations in Somalia started as a traditional peacekeeping operation-
UNOSOM I- than turned into peace enforcement operations. Although it was not clear, “to
use all necessary means” included the use of force in self-defense and scope of the self-
defense was again “defense of mandate”.
B- BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
With the disintegration of the Yugoslavia state, three religious groups of Yugoslavia,
Croat Roman Catholics, Serb Orthodox and Bosnian Muslims started to fight each other. The
war in Bosnia was the forceful one since; Bosnia- Herzegovina was a multiethnic nation,
composed of three ethnic groups above mentioned.
42
As a result the UNPROFOR was
established in 1992 “to create the conditions of peace and security required for the
negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis”, in which the Secretary- General
suggested that “normal rules in United Nations peacekeeping operations for the bearing and
use of arms should apply”.
43
This would mean that the force only be used in self-defense or in
defense of the mandate. However, due to the critical situation in Bosnia, in 1993 the UN had
to adopt two resolutions under Chapter VII creating 6 “safe area” in order to protect the
civilian population.
44
Thereafter, the Security Council expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR
and it became the first peacekeeping operation to be authorized to use force in self-defense to
ensure freedom of movement.
45
Under Security Council Resolution 836, the Security Council decided to ensure full
respect for these areas, and expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR:
[A]cting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force,
in reply to bombardments against the safe areas, in reply to bombardments against the safe
areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate
obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of
protected humanitarian convoys.”
46
Lastly, in Security Council Resolution 998, it is stated that the situation in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to deteriorate and that the parties were
not able to agree to a further cease-fire following the breakdown of the cease-fire agreement
of 23 December 1994, and a Rapid Reaction Force established to enable UNPF/UNPROFOR
to carry out its mandate.
47
It would be an integral part of the UNPROFOR and would be
under the existing U.N. chain of command.
                                                            
40
Security Council Resolution S/RES/886 (1993)
41
Sutterlin, n15 above
42
n1, above
43
It is quoted in Sloan, J.,n 19, above
44
Cox, n6, above
45
Ibid
46
It is quoted in Cox, n6, above
47
Security Council Resolution S/RES/998,16 June 1995

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An element of the UNPROFOR’s mandate was to protect “safe areas” and in
accordance with its authority the Rapid Reaction Force took offensive action as part of a co-
ordinated action taken also by NATO airplanes in order to respond to attacks on UN declared
safe areas.
48
The fight in Bosnia finally ceased but after hundreds of thousands of deaths.
49
The UNPROFOR first established as a traditional peacekeeping operation,
however the critical situation in Bosnia led the Security Council to revise and to expand its
mandate. At first, in the mandate use of force limited to the self-defense or defense of the
mandate, but due to the special conditions, the peacekeepers had the authority to take
offensive actions.
C- RWANDA
A peacekeeping operation under the name United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda" (UNAMIR) established for a period of six months to contribute to the security of
the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and
around the city and to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement.
50
In the Resolution the
Security Council did not refer to use of force, however, Cox asserts that the Security Council
did not need that, since to carry out its mandate UNAMIR might have to take action in self-
defense against persons who threatened the means of delivery and distribution of
humanitarian relief.
51
On April 6, 1994 a plane, carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, was shot
down and “the systematic killing of Tutsis and Hutu members of the political opposition
began”
52
However, interestingly the Security Council reduced the size of UNAMIR I from
2500 to 270 personnel limited its mandate to “to act as an intermediary between the parties in
an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; to assist in the resumption of
humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and to monitor and report on
developments in Rwanda.
53
Due to the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very
numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda, the Security Council
expanded the UNAMIR mandate as to contribute to the security and protection of displaced
persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and
maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas and to provide security and
support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; and
authorised the UNAMIR to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who
threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or
                                                                                                                                                                                         
48
Sarooshi, D, n4 above
49
Sloan, J.,n 19, above
50
Security Council Resolution S/RES/872, 5 October 1993
51
Cox, n6, above
52
It is quoted in Sloan, J.,n 19, above
53
Security Council Resolution S/RES/912, 21 April 1994

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the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.
54
In this context, UNAMIR’s
force was increased to 5,500 troops.
55
However it was a bit late, since in Rwanda with an estimate 800,000 people
massacred before UNAMIR had mentioned force.
56
VI-CONCLUSION
                                                            
54
Security Council Resolution S/RES/918, 17 May 1994
55
Ibid
56
Sloan, J.,n 19, above

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The peacekeeping operations were built up by UN in order to get over the negative
affects of cold war on its efficiency. And from the historical development of the
peacekeeping operations, it can be understood that “efficiency is a positive function of use of
force. However on the other hand, the negative result of the use of force is the diminution of
“impartiality”. Impartiality is one of the fundamental principles of the peacekeeping
operations and it affects directly the success of the operations, since it is clear that a
peacekeeping operation cannot terminate the conflicts and disputes without the support of the
local authorities. That is why, in my opinion the use of force causes vicious circle problem
instead of a solution.
I think in the peacekeeping operations, the UN failed to assess the situation fully
and to act in time. Especially in the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda
the UN could not understand the seriousness of the situation. As a result UN had to expand
the mandates of the operations and the scope of the use of force. However, it was late for all
operations, since in Bosnia hundreds of thousands of people died, again in Rwanda with an
estimate 800,000 people massacred and it was the same for Somalia.
In the operations the scope of the use of force or the self-defense remained unclear.
The UN peacekeeping forces are composed of different member state’s soldiers. The
meaning of the self-defense term and the assessment of a threat could change state to state.
This may cause chaos and effects the operation negatively.
BIPLIOGRAPHY
1-
, E.M. Smith, “Collective Security, Peacekeeping, and Ad Hoc Multilateralism” in Ku, C. and
Jacobson, H.K, (ed) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003)
2
- D. Sarooshi, “The United Nations and The Development of Collective Security” (Oxford,
University Press, Oxford 1999)

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13
3
- E. Eckert Amy, Comment, “United Nations Peacekeeping in Collapsed States”, 5 J. Int'l L. & Prac.
273, 282-84 (1996)
4-
Katherine E. Cox, “Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Use of
Force”,(1999) 27 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 239
5-
N Tsagourias. “Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality And The Use Of Force In Peacekeeping: Their
Constitutional Dimension” (2006), 11 J. Conflict & Security L. 465
6- H. Viseman, “Peacekeeping in the International Context” in Rikhye, I.J., and Skjelsbaek, K. (ed.)
The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limits and Prospects”, ( International Peace
Academy, Newyork, 1990)
7-
J.S., Sutterlin, “ The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: Repelling
Aggression and Enforcing Peace”, ( Praeger Publisher, 1995)
8-
R., Murphy, “United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of Force” (2003)
8 J.Conflict&Security L. 71
9-
J., Sloan, “ The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?”
(2007) Hastings Int’l&Comp.L.Rev.385
10-
B., Frederking, “The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold
War”,(Routledge, Oxon 2007)
11- Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
12-
Security Council Resolution S/RES/886 (1993)
13-
Security Council Resolution S/RES/872, 5 October 1993
14
- Security Council Resolution S/RES/912, 21 April 1994
15-
Security Council Resolution S/RES/918, 17 May 1994
THE REFLECTIVE LOG
…The UN is really good at peacekeeping, in fact, and may be the only actor really
capable of doing it. Peacekeeping, as opposed to peace building, peace making, or
peace enforcement, happens when two warring parties are ready to end the conflict
between them, but do not have sufficient mutual trust to lay down their arms. A
neutral third party is needed to, almost literally, stand in between the warring
parties, to ensure that the terms of the settlement are followed and to reassure each
side that the other is adhering to the rules. The UN, as a non-state actor with a
reputation for neutrality and impartiality, is very good at doing this, and is capable of

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drawing peacekeeping forces from smaller, non-aligned states. From the Sinai to the
Golan, from Cambodia to Cyprus, UN peacekeepers can take pride in the fact that
their efforts have helped end numerous conflicts around the world…
Friday, May 23, 2008
Seth Weinberger
;
A professor of international relations and political philosophy at the
University of Puget Sound
.
Security Dilemmas:
A blog dedicated to examining issues of international and national
security, international politics, and international law.
http://securitydilemmas.blogspot.com/2008/05/cant-un-do-anything-right.html
NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND THE SUCCESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
A UN peacekeeping force should be “strictly impartial”.
57
As Sutterlin states, “it
must be prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned.”
58
It is a fact that,
the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation depends on the expectations and assessments of
the parties.
59
Therefore, to ensure impartiality will be very difficult, especially in the conflicts
that include many groups.
60
While assessing the neutrality, impartiality and the success of the
United Nations, its structure must be taken into account. Smith states that in the Charter the
authority of the operation for collective security is awarded to the five permanent members of
the Security Council.
61
As it is known, the permanent states are France, the United Kingdom,
the United States, China, the Russia (before Soviet Union) in other words the powerful states
of the world from 1600’s up to day. They have been up against each other many times in near
past like cold war period. It is a fact that, during the cold war the UN was could not take
action properly in the conflicts. However, when it was founded, the first purpose of UN was
to be effective than the League of Nations. I think nothing has changed today, there is still a
conflict of the interests of powerful states and this conflict shapes their international politics.
That is why, they can not be impartial/neutral.
In every conflict in the world, it can be seen the effects of their interests. The
European Countries; United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands colonized the India and
especially the African countries. They brought up the ethnic and religious differences of those
                                                            
57
Viseman, H. “Peacekeeping in the International Context” in Rikhye, I.J., and Skjelsbaek, K. (ed.) “The United
Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limits and Prospects”, ( International Peace Academy, Newyork, 1990)
p.32
58
Sutterlin, J.S., “ The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: Repelling Aggression and
Enforcing Peace”, ( Praeger Publisher, 1995)
59
n 14, above
60
Ibid
61
Smith, E.M., “Collective Security, Peacekeeping, and Ad Hoc Multilateralism” in Ku, C. and Jacobson, H.K,
(ed) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2003)

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countries that they have never thought about it before, in order to control the colony easily.
When they withdrew their forces from their colonies they drew up the borders of the
countries arbitrarily. The national boundaries cut through the middle of some tribes, and
place parts of them in two or more countries. As a result, in Africa still some countries are
fighting for their borders, and it is same for Pakistan and India. Pakistan and India are the
states that have nuclear weapons and who will be responsible if they use nuclear bombs
against each other?
Everything went worst in Congo just after the withdrawal of Belgium, like in the
other colonies of the European Countries. In those countries, the democracy had not been
established properly and as a result the groups preferred to solve their disputes with arms and
became European gun markets. The African States and factions bought guns while their
people suffered from starvation. The members of the United Nations intervened only when
their interests were under risk. For instance, a peacekeeping operation was established in
Somali because its geopolitical position, to be near the Middle- East, was important.
As it is known, during the war in Bosnia, the Croatians received the support of the
Germany and, the United Kingdom, France and Russia supported Serbians. This caused a
delay in reaching a solution and for two years the world only watched the massacre in
Bosnia. Sloan rightly states that “The United Nations' activities in the former Yugoslavia
proved in many ways to be a disaster. While the fighting in Bosnia ultimately ceased in late
1995 after nearly four years and hundreds of thousands of deaths, this was largely brought
about by the forceful actions of the quasi-enforcement operation and the diplomatic
intervention of the United States which led to the Dayton Agreement. The United Nations
was on the sidelines of this process. The nadir of the United Nations' operations in the former
Yugoslavia came in July 1995 in Srebrenica when some 8,000 Muslim men and boys were
massacred in one of the Security Council's “safe areas,” under the noses of UNPROFOR
troops.”
62
Similarly, the Security Council established a Rapid Reaction Force for Bosnia
only in response to the seizure of 300 UN peacekeepers as hostages.
63
Interestingly, in
Rwanda with an estimate 800,000 people had massacred just before the Security Council
established the UNAMIR II.
The same play was putting on again and again. In 1980’s, during the war between Iraq
and Iran the United States, Russia, China and the other states sold weapons to both sides.
Interestingly, the former Iraq leader Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait with that weapons and
became a threat for the world piece. The United States, United Kingdom and the others
launched a massive air campaign, thereafter occupied Iraqi territory. The war ended after a
cease fire agreement, and in the war, it was estimated that 200,000 Iraqi civilian died. The
Saudi Arabia paid the all costs and United States established military bases in the Middle
East. The mentioned weapons were the reason of the United States’s attack on Iraqi for the
second time after 11 September terrorist attack. Inter alia, United States claimed that Iraqi has
chemical weapons that can be a real treat for the countries in the Middle East and for the
                                                            
62
Sloan, J., “ The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?” (2007) Hastings
Int’l&Comp.L.Rev.385
63
Sarooshi, D., “The United Nations and The Development of Collective Security” (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1999)

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world peace. None of these claims have been sustained but, the United States brought
democracy to Iraqi and approximately one million Iraqi civilian died.
Nowadays the United States has another claim related to Iran. According to United
States, Iran has the capacity and the technology to make nuclear weapons and this mean that
Iran is a potential threat for the world peace. I think it is definitely unfair, while having
nuclear weapons, to declare another country as a threat. The United Nations acts as an
approval authority of the United States, actually today it is really difficult to distinguish UN
from United States. In order to protect its interests, the United States has offered a “new
world order” and declared every country as an enemy who does not give support. For the
United States there is always an exception of rules in international law. The important thing is
to find a legal cover and nowadays it does not seem to be so difficult. It can be sometimes
fight against terrorism, sometimes humanitarian concerns. It uses the UN as a tool to achieve
its objectives. But on the other hand, UN avoided implementing any sanction on Israel that
killed thousands of civilians in Gaza. I think in the past States were more honest, it was easy
to understand what they really intend to do but today the situation is different, an explanation
or a behavior can be understood only after seeing the results. And it is called policy.
In my opinion, the people, live in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Congo, have the best
answer related to impartiality and success of the United Nations.

Описание работы
The League of Nations was founded after the end of World War I, to maintain the world peace and security. However, it could not take an active role regarding the problems that are appeared in the 1930’s. As a result the World War II broke out and the League ceased its activities during the World War II. In 1946 United Nations (UN) took the place of League of Nations, which had the same purposes and same methods. The UN Charter is more detailed and specific than League Covenant, since the founders of the UN aimed to establish more effective mechanism to support the international peace and security.
Содержание
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...3
I-THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS……4
II-THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE IN UN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS……………………………………………………....6
III-PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY………………………………………………………………………………...8
A- SOMALIA…………………………………………………………...8
B- BOSNIA-HEREGOVINA…………………………………………..9
C- RWANDA………………………………………………………… 10
IV-CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………12
BIPLIOGRAPHY